What an Apophaticist Can Know: Divine Ineffability and the Beatific Vision David Efird and David Worsley
The doctrines of divine ineffability and of the beatific vision seem to contradict each other. According to the former, we cannot know the divine essence. But, according to the latter, we will know God fully. To reconcile these doctrines, we first distinguish between propositional and personal knowledge, that is, between knowing about a person and knowing a person, and, following from this distinction, we then distinguish between propositional and personal ineffability, that is, between it being impossible to know about a person and it being impossible to know a person. We then argue God is propositionally ineffable but personally effable.
According to the doctrine of divine ineffability, God is beyond description and comprehension. The belief in this doctrine is one of the hallmarks of apophatic theology, a system of negative theology common to virtually every major Church theologian during the early times of the Church.
1 One of the most influential of these apophatic theologians was the fifth century Pseudo-Dionysius (Denys). In referring to God (Ôthe Transcendent OneÕ), Denys writes in his The Mystical Theology:
It is not soul or mind, nor does it possess imagination, conviction, speech, or understanding....
It cannot be spoken of and it cannot be grasped by understanding.... It has no power, it is not power, nor is it light. It does not live nor is it life. It is not a substance, nor is it eternity or time.... It is neither one nor oneness, divinity nor goodness.... It is not sonship or fatherhood and it is nothing known to us or to any other being. It falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of being.... There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it.... It is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it... for it is ... free of every limitation, beyond every limitation: it is also beyond denial.
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On the same theme, another major figure in early church history was the fourth-century theologian,
Gregory of Nyssa, who writes in his Against Eunomius,
The simplicity of the True Faith assumes God to be that which He is, namely, incapable of being grasped by any term, or any idea, or any other device of our apprehension, remaining beyond the reach not only of the human but of the angelic and all supramundane intelligence, However, despite such protestations, according to the doctrine of the beatific vision, a doctrine also accepted by many (but not all) of these same apophatic theologians, we will one day know God as God knows us. In 1 Corinthians 13:12, the Apostle Paul explains that although in this life we see God as through frosted glass, there is a time coming when 2 Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987: 141. 3 Gregory of Nyssa, 1957: 99. 4 St Augustine, 1953: 259. 5 Thomas Aquinas, 1955: 96. 6 See, for instance, Ayers (2004) on the place of divine incomprehension in Orthodox tradition.
we shall see God face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know God fully, even as I am fully known.
This seeing God face to face, when we know God fully even as we are fully known, is traditionally termed Ôthe beatific visionÕ. Thinking of this vision, Aquinas writes concerning the knowledge we will then have of God:
I answer that final and perfect beatitude can consist in nothing else than the vision of the divine essence. To make this clear, two things must be considered. First, man is not perfectly happy so long as something remains for him to desire and seek. Secondly, the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. No desire leads so high as the desire to understand the truth. For all our other desires, whether of delight or anything else that is desired by man, can come to rest in other things. However, the aforementioned desire does not come to rest until it reaches God, the supreme foundation and maker of all things. For this reason Wisdom aptly says: ÒI dwelt in high places, and my throne was in a pillar of cloudÓ (Sir 24:4). And in Prov 9:3 it is said that ÒShe has sent out her maids to call from the highest places in the town.Ó Let them therefore be ashamed who seek the beatitude of man, so highly situated, in base things.
of this essay, we will briefly introduce both kinds of knowledge and her account of the distinction between them. In the second section, we will explore the effect this distinction has on the nature of divine ineffability, namely, that ineffability could be used in reference to only one kind of knowledge or to both kinds. In the third section, we will offer reasons to favour a more limited conception of divine ineffability, and, in the fourth section, we will show how this limited conception of divine ineffability can be reconciled with the prima facie contradicting doctrine of the beatific vision.
Franciscan and Dominican knowledge
It is easy enough to say roughly what it is to be ineffable, namely, to be ineffable is to be beyond description, or beyond human concepts. However, saying precisely what it is to be ineffable is notoriously difficult, since even in saying that something is beyond human concepts we have described it and applied a human concept to it. 8 Nevertheless, we will tentatively propose two different ways in which we can think about what it is to be ineffable by employing a distinction made by Stump between two kinds of knowledge, namely, Dominican knowledge and Franciscan knowledge (Stump, 2010: 40-63 ).
According to Stump, Dominican knowledge is propositional knowledge, that is, knowledgethat. Franciscan knowledge, on the other hand, is neither propositional knowledge nor is reducible to propositional knowledge. Such knowledge includes knowledge gained from phenomenal experience and from experience of persons, according to Stump. 9 This much is easy to say. However, in virtue of 8 Augustine famously made this point in On Christian Doctrine:
God should not be said to be ineffable, for when this is said something is said. And a contradiction in terms is created, since if that is ineffable which cannot be spoken, then that is not ineffable which is called ineffable. (Augustine, 1958: 10Ð11) . 9 Stump explains this thought in the following way:
I want to claim, however, that there is a kind of knowledge of persons, a Franciscan knowledge, which is non-propositional and which is not reducible to knowledge that. What could that possibly be?, a skeptical objector may ask. But, of course, if I give an answer to the skeptic's question, I will have an incoherent position: in answering the question, I will be presenting in terms of knowledge that what I am claiming could not be presented that way. (Stump, 2010: 52) the irreducibility of Franciscan knowledge to Dominican knowledge, finding a way to illustrate the differences between each kind of knowledge is challenging, since, while Dominican knowledge can be expressed propositionally, for example, Donald Trump knows that Barack Obama was his predecessor, Franciscan knowledge canÕt be expressed propositionally Ð that is the very point of Franciscan knowledge. But we can present some thought experiments in which Franciscan knowledge is manifested Ð we can show the distinction, but we canÕt describe it, in other words.
To begin, phenomenal knowledge, according to Stump, is Franciscan knowledge. She illustrates this with Frank JacksonÕs (in)famous thought experiment about Mary, the super smart colour scientist:
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wave-length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is blue'. (It can hardly be denied that it is in principle possible to obtain all this physical information from black and white television, otherwise the Open University would of necessity need to use colour television.)
What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her Stump distinguishes Ôknowledge-of-personsÕ from the Ôknowledge-howÕ ability hypothesis that Laurence Nemirow (1990) , David Lewis (2004) and Paul Churchill (2004) discuss. The knowledge-how ability hypothesis suggests that experience gives us an ability and nothing more; an ability to remember, imagine or recognize what it is like to have that experience. There is no new knowledge gained at all in this process. The position that Stump takes up, then, is closer to Earl ConeeÕs ÔacquaintanceÕ hypothesis (1994). For Conee, there is no new propositional knowledge gained by experience, but there is something gained beyond mere knowhow, namely, acquaintance with the thing known. previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false. (Jackson, 1982: 130) What is important for StumpÕs purposes is that MaryÕs epistemic position is improved on her departure from her black and white room, when she sees colour for the first time. Either she learns something new or she learns something old in a new way.
10 And this improvement in her epistemic position is the Franciscan knowledge she gains by experiencing colour for the first time, this phenomenal knowledge she now has.
Modifying JacksonÕs thought experiment, Stump asks us to imagine another Mary who has been locked in a room since birth. Mary has never had a second-personal encounter with her mother, and does not have access to any narrative account of her mother. Nevertheless, in MaryÕs room, Mary has access (through encyclopaedias) to all relevant non-narrative propositional information about the existence of her loving mother, along with all that science can teach about her. Stump writes:
When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that Mary will know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything about her mother that could be made available to her in non-narrative propositional form, including her mother's psychological states. Although Mary knew that her mother loved her before she met her, when she is united with her mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be loved. And this will be new for her, even if in her isolated state she had as complete a scientific description as possible of what a human being feels like when she senses that she is loved by someone else. (Stump, 2010: 52) Just as the super smart colour scientist MaryÕs epistemic position is improved upon leaving her black and white room, so is the daughter MaryÕs epistemic position improved upon leaving her lonely room:
either daughter Mary learns something new or she learns something old in a new way upon meeting her mother. With these thought experiments in hand, we now have a way of showing what Franciscan 10 On Paul ChurchlandÕs view, Mary merely learns something old in a new way (Churchland, 1985) . In other words, Churchland would want to say that Franciscan knowledge (the something new) is in some sense captured by what was previously known, namely, pertinent propositional knowledge (the something old).
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knowledge is, even if we canÕt describe it. Now, on our view, this kind of knowledge, and its distinction from Dominican knowledge, is crucial for understanding the doctrine of divine ineffability and how it can be held consistently with the doctrine of the beatific vision. To show this, we turn to explaining the nature of divine ineffability using this distinction.
Divine ineffability
In the previous section we introduced StumpÕs distinction between Dominican knowledge, that is, knowledge expressible by propositions, and Franciscan knowledge, that is, knowledge inexpressible by propositions. In this section, we will briefly examine how the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge might lead to two distinct conceptions of ineffability.
If Franciscan knowledge is indeed by its very nature beyond description, and if, roughly speaking, to be ineffable is to be beyond description, all Franciscan knowledge must be in some sense ÔGod is three in hypostasis, one in ousiaÕ? Jonathan Jacobs tackled this objection in a recent paper, arguing that these beliefs need not in fact be jettisoned. Indeed, Jacobs argued, we can, without contradiction, believe that it is literally, mind-independently true that God is good, and at the same time believe that it is true that God is ineffable. A proposition, he argued, can be fundamentally true (actually carving reality at its joints), or non-fundamentally true (representing an artificial or gerrymandered structure of reality). For Jacobs, divine ineffability asserts that God is fundamentally ineffable, but leaves room for GodÕs non-fundamental effability (for instance, it is non-fundamentally true that God is fundamentally ineffable). 14 He writes:
We can, using non-fundamental propositions, describe God correctly. We can say lots of true things about how God is intrinsically. He is wise, loving. He is three in hypostasis, one in ousia. Such propositions need not be metaphorical. They can be 12 In this case, it might be true in one sense that Mary knows all propositionally reducible knowledge of God whilst in confinement, it just so happens there is no (fundamental) propositional knowledge of God to be had. Of course, Stump has a story about how Franciscan knowledge can be transferred through testimony, and through narrative, so Stump requires the qualification that all information she has be in non-narrative propositional form. Were Mary to have access to narrative, for instance, biblical narrative, she might possess certain limited (or ÔdimÕ, as certain older translations of 1 Corinthians 13:12 read) Franciscan knowledge of God, but that this is possible serves only to reinforce the argument we are presenting. 13 For a further defence of StumpÕs position, see Wolterstorff, 2016 . Note that Wolterstorff describes ÔFranciscanÕ knowledge as Ôobject-knowledgeÕ, and he too distinguishes Ôobject-knowledgeÕ from Ôknow-howÕ. 14 Jacobs thinks all truths have two elements, a truth-bearer and a truth-maker. A truth-bearer represents supposed metaphysical structure, whilst a truth-maker is the feature(s) of reality that make the truth bearer correct. Truths thus consist in the relationship between these two elements. Having established this position, Jacobs suggests that truth-bearers can be made true in more than one way. If a truth-bearer actually does Ôcarve reality at its jointsÕ it is a fundamental truth-bearer. If it proposes an artificial or gerrymandered structure on reality (if it is Ôontologically imperspicuousÕ) it is a non-fundamental truth-bearer. When we describe God in propositional terms, Jacobs concludes, all our descriptions are grounded in God (as an object), but they also all fall into the latter category.
strictly, literally true. And they can be importantly true. We can know them, and understand them. Some may be more fundamental than others, but God is ineffable because no matter what we say truly, we have failed to assert a perfectly fundamental truth. God is non-fundamentally effable, and fundamentally ineffable. (Jacobs, 2015: 167) Having said this much, might JacobÕs solution resolve our initial tension between divine ineffability and the beatific vision? Could this artificial or gerrymandered propositional knowledge of God be sufficient for the sort of knowledge wanted at the beatific vision? There is at least one good reason to think not. Recall that at the beatific vision the Apostle Paul taught that we will come to know God as God knows us. Whilst it might seem plausibly the case that we can only come to artificial or gerrymandered knowledge of God, it seems very strange indeed to say that GodÕs knowledge of us, His creation, is only artificial or gerrymandered, however these terms are to be understood. But if With respect to the divine, in both propositional and personal ineffability, ineffability involves propositional (or ÔDominicanÕ) ineffability. 18 The difference between them is that in the case of propositional ineffability, what it is to be ineffable does not include ÔFranciscanÕ ineffability, whilst in the case of personal ineffability, it does.
Limited divine ineffability
So we have proposed two kinds of ineffability. Certainly, there is nothing logically preventing God from being both propositionally and personally ineffable. However, if God was indeed personally ineffable, it seems difficult to see how we could come to know God as God knows us (or at least, without suggesting that God does not know us very well), and so the doctrine of the beatific vision would remain in tension with the doctrine of divine ineffability.
Preserving the doctrine of the beatific vision certainly seems like a good reason to favour propositional ineffability over personal ineffability, however is this reason alone sufficient to defend the idea that God is in fact personally effable? Perhaps, but it need not do all the work. To the doctrine of divine ineffability may be added the doctrine of divine revelation, that is, the doctrine that through creation, the incarnation 19 , and through scripture, God has in fact revealed something of Himself to humankind. If Franciscan knowledge can be transmitted through second-personal experience and narrative as Stump maintains, and if God has indeed revealed something, indeed anything, of Himself in a creation we can experience, through second-personal interaction in the incarnation, or through the narratives in scripture, it looks like God cannot be personally ineffable. 20 The cost of defending personal ineffability is seemingly, therefore, that both the doctrine of the beatific vision and the doctrine of divine revelation are false Ð and this is, to our minds, a substantial enough cost to justify associating divine ineffability with mere propositional ineffability alone.
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Reconciling divine ineffability with the beatific vision
If we postulate that God is propositionally ineffable but personally effable, God remains both beyond (fundamental) description and beyond (fundamental) human concepts, in that knowledge of him can never be fully comprehended by or captured in (fundamental) descriptions or concepts, and in this way, the doctrine of divine ineffability can be upheld. Nevertheless, through some sort of intense second-personal experience at the beatific vision, 22 God can still be personally known, fully and completely, just as we are taught in the doctrine of the beatific vision. To see how this might be the case, recall StumpÕs previously mentioned Mary thought experiment. When it comes to MaryÕs knowledge of her mother, both Franciscan and Dominican knowledge ally together. However, both kinds of knowledge are not simultaneously required for Mary to have some knowledge of her mother.
We can see that this is the case as prior to meeting her, we take it that Mary had only Dominican knowledge of her mother. But MaryÕs knowledge need not be limited to Dominican/Franciscan or Dominican only. Nothing in this thought experiment requires that Mary has access every piece of Dominican knowledge about her mother. And, if the thought experiment still works (albeit without 20 Adding to doctrine of the beatific vision and the doctrine of divine revelation, are the testimonies of those who claim to know God (even if the knowledge is presently ÔdimÕ). If divine ineffability entailed personal ineffability, such people could not, in fact, know God, and would therefore be mistaken in their claims. 21 We recognise that this isnÕt a particularly strong argument, however we canÕt see any other way around this.
As we see it, given the seeming logical possibility of each, arbitration between these two positions comes down to which position incurs the greatest cost, where the cost is measured in terms of accepted doctrines one must sacrifice, and the route we are defending sees us sacrifice the fewest accepted doctrines. 22 See [removed for peer review] for one way in which to view the form such intense second-personal experience might take. Somewhat analogously, this second-person experience would be a more intense version of MaryÕs initial meeting with her mother in StumpÕs earlier described thought experiment.
